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Abstract
In this paper we address the question whether in case of population ageing a
transition from an unfunded to a more funded pension scheme is politically
feasible in a representative democracy. We consider two parties: a right-wing
party which is willing to trade off intragenerational equity against efficiency
gains in intergenerational redistribution, and a left-wing party which does not
want to adjust the level of intragenerational distribution. We show that, in an
economy with an exogenously given interest rate, only a thus defined right-
wing government will propose a social-security reform. Moreover, we
demonstrate that such a policy proposal may lead to electoral success if it
entails an appropriate mix of distributional efficiency and equity.
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The ageing of the population is one of the most important phenomena of the beginning
of this new millennium1, and is considered to going to be a threat for future Pay-
As-You-Go (PAYG) …nanced social-security arrangements in many countries. Such
schemes are known to have an internal rate of return lower than the rate of return of
funded schemes (i.e., the interest rate on savings) and ageing deteriorates their rate
of return even further. Some economists therefore advocate a complete (and fast)
transition from unfunded to funded schemes by ‘privatising’ social security (see e.g.,
Feldstein [1996]). In the 2000 US presidential campaign, the debate about ‘privati-
sation’ of the social-security system boiled down to the issue of the implementation
of private retirement accounts which, linked to tax cuts, was a key issue in the pro-
gram of the Republican candidate George W. Bush. The Democratic candidate, Al
Gore, basically ran the campaign on the promise to keep the current social-security
arrangements intact and to simultaneously try to minimise the crowding e¤ects to
other policy …elds by devoting a part of the budget surplus to a running down of the
national debt.
The Republican privatisation proposal does not explicitly address adjustments of
the social-security bene…ts. However, it is well known that PAYG-pension schemes
are Pareto e¢cient (see Verbon [1989], or Breyer [1989]). That is, although the
transformation of a PAYG-scheme in a capital reserve system increases utility in the
long run, it harms at least one generation.2 Naturally, the group that will be harmed
after the introduction of private retirement accounts will be the currently retired who
will see their bene…t decrease due to the retrieval of tax money for the implementation
of private accounts. Thus, this implementation will not be unanimously supported.
But, of course, in democracies decisions do not have to be made under unanimity.
Even though unanimity is not a prerequisite, in a direct democracy the prospect for
pension reform remains rather bleak. In this respect, the classic result of Browning
(1975), stating that a ‘too high’ bene…t level in a PAYG-scheme will be adopted,
and that one might, moreover, expect an upward pressure on the bene…t level if the
population is ageing, is quite unequivocal.3 However, in a representative democracy,
1In the year 2030 more than 30 percent of the total population in the OECD countries will be
over 60 years of age whereas in 1990 this was only 18 percent. See e.g. The Economist, ‘All our
tomorrows: a survey of the economics of ageing’, January 27th 1996, or more recently The United
Nations World Population Prospects: The 1998 Revision. In particular, the elderly dependency
ratio in the US is expected to rise from 19 % in the year 2000 to 35 % in the year 2040.
2If reducing or abolishing the PAYG-scheme goes along with the reduction or elimination of a
negative external e¤ect, as for example the distortion of the labour-leisure decision caused by a
PAYG-payroll tax as in Homburg (1990), then a Pareto-improving transition to a funded system is
possible. Likewise, this can be achieved if the increase in savings that results from a reduction of
the PAYG-scheme has positive external e¤ects; for example under an endogenous-growth scenario
as in Belan et al. (1998). Finally, assuming endogenous fertility, Groezen et al. (2000) show that a
combined policy of decreasing the PAYG-tax and introducing child allowances can also result in a
Pareto-improvement.
3The intuition of Browning’s result is that under majority voting the median voter is relatively
old, who, in considering the marginal costs of any bene…t level, considers her past contributions as
sunk costs which she does not include in trading o¤ the marginal costs (her future contributions)
and the marginal bene…ts (her future bene…ts). Ageing implies that the median voter will be older,
1direct voting on issues by the population does, in general, not occur. Instead, elected
politicians, representing political parties, trade o¤ gains for some groups against losses
for other groups. At one point in time, exogenous shocks like population ageing can
make it politically advantageous for political decision makers to decrease one group’s
utility in favour of an increase in utility of another group. Pension reform then might
become feasible. The prospect of an ageing population could therefore have been one
of the reasons why in the 2000-presidential campaign social-security reform turned
out to be one of the key issues and was apparently no longer considered to be the
third rail of American politics.4
This paper analyses the politics of transitions from unfunded to funded pensions
in reaction to population ageing in a representative democracy. The support for
political parties is assumed to depend on the utility that groups derive from political
decisions on relevant issues. A political party maximises its (re-)election prospect
by maximising some (politically) weighted sum of utilities. We will assume that
parties (and therefore also politicians) are only liable to current generations, but,
in spite of that, we exclude the possibility to exploit government debt to shift the
burden of the transition to future generations. There are several reasons for this
exclusion. Firstly, in many countries, the possibility for the government to use debt
as an instrument is constrained by exogenous institutional restrictions. In the US,
for example, each year the Board of Trustees of the Social Security trust fund has
to design, by law, a schedule of current and future tax rates to …nance the program
over a 75-years horizon, under the (apparently implicit) assumption that the Trust
Fund is not allowed to have a negative wealth position. Secondly, even without such
restrictions, a government cannot unlimitedly increase public debt. A representative
government, that is only liable to current generations, will already have raised debt
to its maximum level, leaving no room for additional government de…cits.5 Finally,
as the purpose of the transition to funded social security is primarily to relieve the
burden for the current young and unborn generations, it seems not very useful to
saddle these generations with additional public debt. In fact, the transition then just
replaces implicit debt by explicit debt and does not improve their welfare.
A basic insight that results from our analysis is that, when the interest rate is
exogenously determined at the world capital market, a transition from a PAYG-
scheme to a capital reserve system in reaction to ageing can only come about if
politicians have an instrument at their disposal to introduce substitution e¤ects on
the savings decision. The point is that, if taxes (and bene…ts) only generate income
e¤ects, politicians will not be able to e¤ectively stimulate savings by the young. An
increase in savings is needed, however, for a conversion from a PAYG-scheme to a
funded system. By decreasing PAYG-transfers, and stimulating savings, politicians
will realise utility gains for the younger generations. If the resulting increase in
so that for her the marginal costs of increasing the pension bene…t will be even lower.
4See for example the Economist survey on the economics of ageing of January, the 27th, 1996:
“Even in America, where the quest for a balanced budget has caused many assumptions to be re-
examined, conversations about social security always seem to lead up to the phrase: It’s like the
third rail: touch it, and you’re dead.”
5For an analysis of decision making on public debt in a representative democracy see Meijdam,
Van de Ven and Verbon (1996).
2political support by the young makes up for the decrease in political backing by the
elderly, whose utility decreases as a result of the transition, a pension reform will be
politically feasible. To enable politicians to a¤ect the savings decision, and thus to
realise a social security reform, we introduce a capital tax, i.e., a tax on savings. The
proceeds of this tax are assumed to be rebated in a lump-sum fashion, so that it can
be viewed as an instrument for intragenerational redistribution among the elderly
only.
We consider two political parties di¤ering in ideology. The way we formulate
ideology was inspired by the positions in the debate on pension reform taken by the
candidates in the 2000 US presidential campaign, alluded to above. One party, which
we dub right-wing, is willing to trade o¤ intragenerational equity against e¢ciency
gains in intergenerational redistribution. The other, labeled left-wing, is opposed to
any adjustment of the level of intragenerational redistribution. That is, the left-wing
party will never use the capital tax to stimulate savings and thus to realise a social-
security reform. We show that, as a consequence of this, in case of ageing, a left-wing
policy implies that the economy is trapped at the pre-existing level of savings. The
right-wing party, however, is inclined to sacri…ce intragenerational equity by relaxing
the disincentives the capital tax entails for savings in order to reform the pension
system and thus to increase the e¢ciency of intergenerational redistribution. This
indeed allows for a partial transition from PAYG to funded pensions in case of an
ageing population.
Given that additional debt creation is excluded, the decrease in the PAYG-bene…t
that is necessary to realise a transition decreases the oldest living generations’ utility,
while raising the youngest living generations’ utility. We show, however, that in
principle a transition may be politically feasible if ageing occurs. More precisely, we
demonstrate that a right-wing reform plan may beat the left-wing policy proposal that
keeps the PAYG-scheme intact in the elections if at the outset a (strictly positive)
distortionary tax on savings is in place. A striking consequence of this result is that
subsidies on savings, which in the real world frequently occur, are not a suitable
point of departure for starting a conversion policy. Moreover, in practice, it may be
very hard to …nd a politically feasible reform plan as it is crucial that such a plan is
optimally tuned. In particular, a proposal for a fast transition process with high cuts
in pension bene…ts will not carry the election. The intuition for this result is that
a fast transition will strongly harm the current retirees while it does not su¢ciently
bene…t the young to make up for this, as for them the positive e¤ect of a low PAYG-
tax when young is largely o¤set by the negative e¤ect of an even lower tax - and thus
a lower PAYG-bene…t - when old. Only plans with very gradually declining taxes
and thus very slowly rising private savings may survive in the political arena.
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 presents the well-known two-period
overlapping-generations (OLG) model for the private sector that forms the basis of
our analysis. In section 3 we describe the target function and the instruments of the
representative government. The e¤ects of a right-wing and a left-wing policy, when
applied to an ageing economy, are analysed in Section 4. In this section, we also
discuss the political feasibility of the right-wing proposal for a transition to funded
social-security. Section 5 concludes.
32 The private sector
Consider an economy with an exogenously given interest rate r, determined on the
world capital market and assumed to be constant over time. Production is described
by a standard constant-returns-to-scale production function, so that the wage rate is
also …xed. The economy is populated by a large number of non-altruistic agents who
live for two periods, so that in each period both a young and an old generation are
alive. When young, the agent inelastically supplies one unit of labour.6 We assume
lifetime utility of a representative agent born on date t to be additively separable and















t denotes consumption during youth and co
t+1 denotes the consumption of the
same individual while old. The parameter ½ indicates the pure rate of time preference.
A part ¿ of the labour income, that is normalised to 1, is taxed away by the
government in a lump-sum fashion to be transferred to the currently living old. The




t = 1 ¡ ¿t ¡ st: (2)
When old, savings may be taxed by a (possibly negative) capital tax » explained in
more detail in the next section.9 The old agent consumes his net savings, including
their returns, and the transfer payment ¢ from the government which the (atomistic)




t+1 = (1 ¡ »t+1 + r)st + ¢t+1: (3)










6Allowing for endogenous labour supply considerably complicates the analysis, but does not a¤ect
the main results. The reason for this is that the supply of labour can be eliminated from the model
using the …rst-order conditions. The dynamical system that results in that case is equivalent to the
one in case of exogenous labour supply.










t+1 depends on the interest rate and the discount factor only.
8In addition to public pensions and savings, the elderly’s consumption is often …nanced by private
occupational pension schemes that are typically fully funded. In this paper we assume that private
occcupational pension schemes can be identi…ed with individual savings for old age.
9Alternatively, we could assume a tax on capital income instead of a tax on capital. This would,
however, not a¤ect the results.
43 Political decision making
As noted in the Introduction, we assume that decisions on social security are made
in a representative democracy.10 In this representative democracy, there is not an
in…nitely long lived government that optimises social welfare, but a sequence of gov-
ernments exists where, as in a two-party democracy, each period a di¤erent political
party can be voted into o¢ce. As a result, decisions made by any government are
unrelated to past or future incumbent parties. The political parties take account only
of the interests of both the current young and the current old. So, at time t; they
maximise a politically weighted average of the utilities of generations currently alive
(that is, of all current voters):
Wt = ¸Ut¡1 + (1 + nt)Ut; (5)
where nt stands for the rate of population growth at time t. Throughout the paper it is
assumed that the economy is dynamically e¢cient (r > nt; 8t). The political weight
¸ > 0 can be interpreted as a measure for the political in‡uence of an old agent
relative to a young one, which is determined exogenously, for example through an
implicit process of lobbying and/or rent seeking of the di¤erent generations currently
alive.11 Foundations for this approach can be found in Hettich and Winer (1988)
and Grossman and Helpman (1994).12 Maximising Wt can also be interpreted as
maximising the (re-)election probability, allowing for the impact of (in our case two)
interest groups (see Coughlin et al. [1988]). In a two-party system, this implies that
if a political party, at time t; proposes a platform with less political support relative
to the support for the platform of the competing party, it will lose the next election.
If we abstract from administrative costs, the (balanced) budget constraint for the
government at date t is given by
(1 + nt)¿t + »tst¡1 = ¢t: (6)
Two remarks are in order. Firstly, notice that we assume that the revenues of the
capital tax are used for …nancing social-security bene…ts. Consequently, capital taxa-
tion is purely intragenerational redistribution. Of course, in our representative-agent
10For an overview of decision making in a representative democracy we refer to Gärtner (1994)
and Verbon (1993).
11The political weight ¸ is the equilibrium result of the activities of the pressure groups repre-
senting the young and old, respectively. Therefore, as Becker (1983) points out, even if the marginal
absolute pressure of, for example the old, were in…nitely large, this does not hold for the marginal
relative pressure - that is captured by the parameter ¸ - , because the young will react with increased
counteractivities. It is beyond the framework of this paper and our simple characterisation of the
political process to take explicitly into account the relation between group size and the activities
of pressure groups that try to in‡uence the representative government. Therefore we ignore the
fact that organising larger groups aggravates the free-rider-problem and therefore lowers the relative
political in‡uence (Olson [1965], Becker [1983]), and take ¸ to be constant.
12Notice that the target function of the representative government is a truncated version of a
Benthamite social welfare function. Bernheim (1989) calls this “the most natural class of welfare
functions for a representative government” (p.124). Although his approach inhibits the presence of
some explicit sort of altruism, it is comparable to our framework where the representative government
also has to display some sort of ‘political altruism’ towards both groups of current voters in order
to survive politically.
5model this intragenerational redistribution has no e¤ect (as it is just shifting of funds),
except for a disincentive to save. We do allow for it, however, because, as noted earlier
and to be shown rigourously later on, the existence of a capital tax is of importance
for the political feasibility of a transition to a funded pension scheme.
Secondly, the capital tax in place at time t is imposed upon savings formed at
time t ¡ 1. Given our perfect-foresight assumption, savers at time t ¡ 1 will be able
to tell the size of the capital tax at time t. The government at time t can no longer
change the impact of this capital tax on savings held by the current elderly, born at
time t ¡ 1, as these are given at time t. So, the only remaining motive for altering
the capital tax will be a modi…cation of the distribution of income over the elderly
people.
Obviously, we cannot explicitly model political decision-making on intragenera-
tional redistribution in our representative agent model. However, for the possibility
of pension reform we only need to identify two political parties that di¤er in their
ideology with respect to the trade-o¤ they allow to exist between intergenerational
and intragenerational redistribution. As stated in the Introduction, this way of mod-
elling ideology was inspired by the positions taken by the candidates in the 2000 US
presidential campaign. One party, which we dub left-wing, is not willing to sacri…ce
intragenerational equity for e¢ciency in intergenerational redistribution. This party
thus sets a level for the PAYG-tax ¿t and, independently from this PAYG-tax, ef-
fectuates a constant rate of capital taxation »t = » > 0; 8t (which we assume to
be exogenously determined as we do not explicitly model intragenerational redistri-
bution). The other party, labeled right-wing, is inclined to give up some intragen-
erational equity for a more e¢cient pension system. That is, the right-wing party
relates the amount of intragenerational redistribution (through the capital tax »t) to
the amount of intergenerational redistribution (via ¿t). In particular, we assume that
the capital tax chosen by the right-wing party depends negatively on the desired level
of the PAYG-tax:






i.e., more intergenerational redistribution goes along with less intragenerational re-
distribution.13 Notice that, if relation (7) holds, the net return on savings depends
on the capital tax and thus on the level of the social-security tax when old. So, the
future PAYG-tax causes a substitution e¤ect in addition to the normal income e¤ect.
As a consequence of this, the intertemporal allocation of consumption varies over time
with ¿ (see equation 4). As we will show below, this may allow for a partial transition
from PAYG to a funded system in case of ageing, by stimulating individuals to save
more if the PAYG-system loses in importance.
In each period t; the incumbent government determines the level of the social-
security tax ¿t in that period (and if »t is a function of ¿t they thus implicitly de-
termine the level of the capital tax). We assume that in doing so it takes private
13It might be emphasised here that our analysis pertains to an ageing population, so that the
PAYG-tax is likely to increase anyway. Equation (7) thus implies that, in this case, the right-wing
party will be inclined to decrease the capital tax.
6savings in period t as given.14 Because the current and future taxes are only linked
through current savings, this assumption implies that future taxes are also taken as
given. The optimal PAYG-tax in period t follows from maximising (5) subject to the









It follows directly from (4) and (8) that in the steady state »(¿) ´ » = ¸ ¡1¡r has
to hold.
4 Ageing and pension reform
This section considers the pension policies of left–wing and right-wing governments
who have to deal with an increasing elderly dependency ratio. Population ageing
is interpreted as a once-and-for-all decrease in the rate of population growth (n).
First, we investigate whether, in the presence of an ageing population, these govern-
ments will pursue a (partial) transition from the PAYG-system to a funded pension
scheme. We show that a right-wing government will reform the pension system by
stimulating private savings while a left-wing government will only increase transfers.
Subsequently, we analyse the political feasibility of a pension reform. That is, we
investigate the possibilities for the right-wing party which favours a transition to a
capital reserve system to win the election and to pursue this policy.
Compared to the case where the PAYG-system remains unaltered, a pension re-
form necessitates a fall in the utility of the elderly living at the time the reform is
initiated, but enables an increase in utility for current (and future) young generations.
A reform is only politically feasible, that is, politicians will only be able to enact a
transition to funded pensions, if the decrease in political backing by the elderly (due
to their experienced loss in utility) is (more than) compensated by the additional
political support of the young. Regarding the latter, however, lifetime utility of cur-
rently young voters is also determined by decisions of future politicians (who decide
on their bene…t level and, maybe, on the net return on their savings). In turn, future
politicians’ decisions depend on measures of politicians succeeding them. This implies
that politicians have to be forward looking by taking account of the total sequence of
future decisions in response to their own decision making. Analytically, this implies
that our model has to be solved as a (saddlepoint-stable) dynamic system with two
state variables, the PAYG-tax and the private savings. The solution of this dynamic
system is presented in Section 4.2. The economic intuition of our result, however,
can also be grasped by considering a conventional graphical analysis which will be
14That is, we analyse the Nash-solution of the game between politicians and the private sector.
Alternatively, one could assume that the government acts as a Stackelberg-leader towards the private
sector. However, the government is not a natural leader in this game. Within one period (one
generation), private savings may react to the PAYG-tax (the current capital tax does not a¤ect
current savings) but the tax may also react to the level of savings. Therefore, the Nash-solution
seems most appropriate.
7presented in the next subsection. In Section 4.3 we will discuss whether a conversion
policy can be a winning platform in an election.
4.1 A sketch of the options for pension reform
In this subsection, we examine the policy options resulting from the two alternative
cases under consideration, i.e., one where »t = » (left-wing policy) and one where
»
0
t < 0 (right-wing policy). To get a clear picture of the alternative cases, we con-
sider what will happen if the policy under consideration will be upheld inde…nitely.
Thus, we …rst consider the case where »t = » holds inde…nitely, after which we turn
to the case where »
0
t < 0 permanently holds. Notice that the steady-state condition
»(¿) ´ » = ¸¡1¡r has to hold in both cases. This implies that, if the capital tax »t
is a function of the social-security tax ¿t, i.e., »(¿t), the PAYG-tax will be uniquely
determined in the steady state. If a demographic shock occurs, the PAYG-tax may
change as a result, but will (and even has to) return to its previous value in the
new steady state, as a change in the demographic composition of the population is
assumed to have no direct e¤ect on political a¤airs (captured by the parameter ¸)
and on the gross return on savings (1 + r). When the capital tax is not related to
the PAYG-tax, however, the steady state social-security tax cannot be determined
uniquely. A continuum of steady states exists. Each steady state represents a level
of intergenerational redistribution (determined by the social-security tax ¿) in com-
bination with a unique level of intertemporal consumption smoothing (denoted by
the level of private savings s). Which steady state will eventually come about is
path dependent (we thus have an example of hysteresis at hand). However, given an
initial steady state with some level of the PAYG-tax, the ensueing changes following
a demographic shock can unambiguously be determined, as will become clear below.
In order to make the two cases comparable, we start from the assumption that the
social-security tax in the initial steady state is the same for both cases.
Left-wing policy
In Figure 1, budget constraints of a representative individual are sketched. It is
assumed that the line AA0 represents the consumption possibilities of an individual
for some given level of the PAYG-tax before a demographic shock.
8The political …rst-order condition (8) is in the …gure represented by the straight
line OP starting from the origin. As this condition has to hold, the allocation of
consumption to the current generations (c
y
t;co
t) has to be on this line. Point E denotes
the initial steady-state equilibrium. Now, consider what will happen if at time t = 0
a once-and-for-all demographic shock occurs. As in this case the capital tax is not
related to the PAYG-tax (i.e., »
0 = 0), the demographic shock and the ensueing
shifts in the PAYG-tax only cause income e¤ects. Keeping the social-security tax at
its initial level, the lifetime budget constraint for the current young shifts inward to
BB0, where young individuals will select E0 as their preferred consumption allocation,
with young-age (old-age) consumption equal to c
y0
0 (co0
1 ). The elderly, however, at the
time of the shift are left with consumption possibilities in point Q, giving a level of
consumption equal to co0
0 . As the resulting allocation of consumption to the current
generations at time 0 (i.e., c
y0
0 and co0
0 ) is not on the line OP, the government will
alter the PAYG-tax ¿ along the budget restriction of the PAYG-system (which is
represented in Figure 1 by the dotted line Qb E) leading to an allocation b E. So, an
incumbent left-wing government increases the social-security tax and the young have
to bear an extra part of the costs of ageing, additional to a situation in which the
PAYG-scheme would not have been expanded. Naturally, lifetime utility of the young
will be below the utility level that would have been obtained in case of an unchanged
PAYG-tax, i.e., the utility level corresponding to E0. If no further shocks occur, b E
9will be the new steady state: future politicians can only change the intergenerational
redistribution along the budget constraint Qb E so that they have no other option than
to stick to b E, with (c
y
t)»0=0 = b cy and (co
t)»0=0 = b co.
The upshot is that, in the absence of an explicit instrument to stimulate savings,
left-wing politicians cannot aim for the higher old-age consumption levels co0
1 for the
current young because that would imply that current young-age consumption has to
be too large for being compatible with the political optimum.15 As a result of the
increased redistribution from the young to the elderly, savings will be una¤ected in
the new steady state b E compared to the steady state before the shock, E. That is,
the economy is trapped at the pre-existing level of savings and there is no transition
towards a more funded pension scheme. This will be shown more explicitly in the
next subsection.
Right-wing policy
Right-wing politicians face di¤erent constraints than left-wing politicians, as the level
of the capital tax now is negatively related to the level of the PAYG-tax in place.
Notice, …rstly, that the new steady state will have to be at E0 as the steady-state
condition »(¿) = ¸ ¡ 1 ¡ r …xes the long-run social-security tax ¿. Secondly, a
potential substitution e¤ect allows for di¤erent redistribution policies in the short
run. As before, with the initial value of the PAYG-tax, ¿, after a demographic shock
has occurred, the system is in point Q: Now the right-wing politicians will, just as




on the line OP. However, the substitution e¤ect that is operative now makes it




o¤ the line OP. As »
0 < 0; a current increase in the social-security tax along the
line Qb E (and thereby future increases in this tax) will entail a positive substitution
e¤ect for the current young (due to the lower capital tax they are facing when old)
stimulating old-age consumption versus young-age consumption. Consequently, the
PAYG-tax does not have to increase all the way to b E in order to satisfy the political
…rst-order condition. As individual savings generate a higher return than ‘public
savings’ through the PAYG-system, this shift provides the potential for utility gains
for the young compared to the steady state b E.
15The point is that given homotheticity of the consumption function the proportion of young-age
vs. old-consumption will remain constant for an individual, see equation (4), as long as substitution
e¤ects are absent.
10In Figure 2, consumption for the current old is increased in point Q0 compared to
the consumption in point Q. With this increase in ¿; the lifetime budget constraint
of the young rotates to DD0; and their lifetime allocation of consumption E00 is such




0) will obey the political …rst-order condition, that is, this distribution is
on the line OP. At E00 the young experience a higher utility than at b E, the status-
quo lifetime allocation. The cost of this shift towards more old-age consumption is
obviously a decrease in consumption for the current old, compared to b E. The next
generation of politicians will set the PAYG-tax (and thereby implicitly the capital
tax) such that the consumption of the new-born young generation and the elderly
obey the political …rst-order condition again.16 In Figure 2, it has been assumed
that the new steady state, E0, immediately emerges at time t = 1. As a result, from
period t = 2 onwards, the social-security tax and the capital tax will remain constant
(and equal to their initial steady-state values). In general, however, the PAYG-tax
will asymptotically converge to the steady state. During the transition process, the
capital tax will remain lower than in the initial steady state, and the PAYG-tax will
be higher, leading to a higher old-age consumption than generated by the allocation
16More precisely, the capital tax at time t + 1, i.e., »t+1, determines the savings decision at time
t, while the choice of »t, through the choice of ¿t, has within-generation redistributive e¤ects only.
11b E for future generations. Eventually, the new steady state E0 will be reached. As
is clear from Figure 2, this new steady state corresponds to a higher lifetime utility
relative to the level of lifetime utility under b E.
We thus …nd that, by having an instrument to boost savings, a right-wing gov-
ernment can enact a partial transition to a more funded system. It can be expected,
and will be shown in the next subsection, that during and after the transition savings
will be higher than in the steady state before the demographic shock.
4.2 The comparative dynamics of ageing
We now present a more formal derivation of the above results. The analysis is based
on a linearised version of the model presented in the previous sections. The short-run
e¤ects are traced by comparative dynamics.17
Let nt = n + ¼ht, where ht describes the time pattern of a perturbation of the
steady-state value of the rate of population growth and ¼ is a measure for the mag-
nitude. The model is linearised around the initial steady state by di¤erentiation of
the equations (2)-(4), (6) and (8) with respect to ¼. This yields the following system























5; t = 0;1;:::; (9)
where J is the Jacobian matrix and M is a matrix describing the e¤ects of the current
and next-period change in the rate of population growth.18 This system can be used
to describe the evolution of savings and the PAYG-tax in reaction to ageing, given
the predetermined level of savings of the old in period t = 0: It is assumed that ageing
occurs unexpectedly, i.e., h0 = h1 = ¢¢¢ = h < 0.19
For expositional reasons, we …rst analyse the right-wing policy, i.e., the policy
with a negative relation between intragenerational and intergenerational redistribu-
tion (»
0
t < 0), so that a larger PAYG-tax is accompanied by a lower tax on capital.
Then we derive what happens in case of a left-wing policy where no relation be-
tween both forms of redistribution exists, i.e., »
0
t = 0: For the algebra underlying the
following graphical analysis, we refer to parts A and B of the Appendix.
Right-wing policy
The e¤ects of an unexpected decrease in the rate of population growth when a larger
PAYG-tax on labour goes along with a lower capital tax (i.e., »
0 < 0) are displayed
in Figure 3. This …gure displays the phase diagram of the linear system (9) for
17The method of comparative dynamics was …rst introduced by Judd (1982) for a continuous-time
model. It can easily be transformed to discrete time, however. The method is explained in part B
of the Appendix.














@¼ , respectively. The
intersection of these lines gives the new steady state of the model. The derivation
of these phaselines can be found in part B of the Appendix and yields the following
equations:20

























The phaselines before the shock (which can be found by inserting h = 0 into equa-
tions (10)) intersect in the origin. Ageing leads to an outward shift of the phaselines
and, consequently, to a new steady state indicated by E0, which corresponds to E0 in
Figures 1 and 2. As is immediately clear from the graph, taxes will not be a¤ected
but savings are larger in E0. If there were no change in the PAYG-tax after the
demographic change, the system would get stuck at Q. However, as discussed earlier,
Q is not a feasible point as the political …rst-order condition does not hold. So, a
transition process will start, bringing the system to its new steady state, E0. The
arrows indicate the dynamics in the points between the phaselines. As the model
is saddlepoint stable, there is a unique stable trajectory (drawn as a dotted line)
converging to the new steady state.
20As the initial steady-state level of the capital tax is only of importance for the political feasibility
of the pension reform and does not qualitatively a¤ect the dynamics underlying the transition from
PAYG to capital reserve, for expositional simplicity we assume that » = 0 in the initial steady state,
that is ¸ = 1 + r. The analysis can easily be generalised to positive and negative initial values for
», where » < 0 refers to an initial subsidy on savings.
13Starting at the time of the demographic shock (t = 0), the following process
develops. At t = 0; savings by the old are given and only the social-security tax
can react. This initial e¤ect on the PAYG-tax can be found by applying the method
developed by Blanchard and Kahn (1980) to system (9). This exercise is executed
in part B of the Appendix. In Figure 3, the initial change in the social-security
tax is indicated by point Q0 which is on the intersection of the stable manifold of
the system and the @¿
@¼-axis. That is, the right-wing politicians initially react to the
unexpected decrease in the population growth rate n by an enlargement of the PAYG-
scheme to compensate the currently living old. The increase in the tax is not large
enough, however, to make the consumption for the currently living old as high as
the level of old-age consumption for subsequent generations, which would require a
jump to b E. As a result of the jump to Q0; savings increase, which is mainly due to
the lower capital tax in the following period (along with the lower PAYG-bene…t)
which accompanies the increase in the future PAYG-tax. In the following periods,
the PAYG-tax and private savings evolve along the stable manifold until the new
steady state is reached. Notice that the adjustment path implies that the initially
enlarged PAYG-scheme is gradually and partly replaced by a capital reserve system,
where old-age consumption is to a larger degree …nanced out of private savings. The
long-run e¤ect on the level of savings follows from inserting @¿








(1+r)(2+½)¿h > 0. As the burden of ageing is allocated
to the periods of life according to equation (4), the long-run e¤ects on young-age and












With a constant capital tax (not related to the level of the social-security tax), the
economy appears to be trapped at its attained level of savings before ageing, and the
only possible consumption paths are those which do not alter the intergenerational






t ; t = 0;1;:::. The intuition for this result can be seen most clearly by
once more inspecting Figure 1. In this case, the intergenerational and the intertempo-
ral link between young-age and old-age consumption is …xed in time, and politicians
have no desire to break the intergenerational link (as the political …rst-order condition
tells them to maintain it) and no instrument to break the intertemporal link between
old-age consumption and young-age consumption within the same generation.
Figure 4 depicts the phase diagram for this case. This …gure is a squeezed version
of the diagram in Figure 3. In Figure 3, the stable manifold and the two phaselines
are all three distinguishable and only intersect in the (new) steady state. For the
phaselines the di¤erence between the left-wing and the right-wing policy is given by
the parameter Á in equation (10). With a …xed tax on capital, Á = 0 holds and
the two phaselines ( ¢s = 0 and ¢¿ = 0, respectively) coincide. Consequently,
there is an in…nite number of steady states. Moreover, no saddlepoint dynamics
exist, as the system contains one unit root and one unstable root (given dynamic
e¢ciency, see part B of the Appendix for details). Hence, any change of the PAYG-
tax that does not immediately reach a new steady state will lead to implosive or
explosive paths as indicated by the dotted arrows in Figure 4. In other words, at
the time of the shock, the tax will have to jump immediately to its new steady-state
value. As, at the time of the shock, the level of savings of the then living old is
15predetermined, the social-security tax has to jump to the phaseline ¢s = ¢¿ = 0
at the point where @s0
@¼ = 0 (see the solid curved arrow in Figure 4), which point is
indicated by b E in the …gure. So, the change in the level of private savings due to
an unexpected decrease in the rate of population growth n is equal to zero in the
short run as well as in the long run. The left-wing politicians in this system are thus
caught by a savings trap: ageing leads to a rise of the PAYG-tax with the long-run
e¤ect being equal to the short-run e¤ect, and there is no way in which politicians
can incite individuals to increase their savings. Therefore, a partial transition from
PAYG to a more funded system is not feasible. The e¤ect on the level of the PAYG-
tax follows from inserting @s0
@¼ = @s1
@¼ = ¢¢¢ = @s
@¼ = 0 into equations (10), producing
@¿0
@¼ = @¿1







(1+r)+(1+n)(1+½)¿h > 0. Again, the burden of ageing is










»0=0 < 0: Note that in the long run this fall in both young-age









»0<0 due to dynamic e¢ciency (r > n). Consequently, with a negative
relation between intragenerational redistribution and intergenerational redistribution
(i.e., »
0 < 0), steady-state lifetime utility is higher than without such a relation.
4.3 Political feasibility of transition
In the Introduction, we noted that in the US the debate about ‘privatisation’ of
the social-security system has been interpreted as meaning that workers should be
given individual retirement accounts, and tax cuts should make it more attractive
to try to generate returns from these assets. This is precisely what the policy with
»
0
t < 0 is achieving: in this policy, part of the budget initially available for the
pension bene…ts is channeled to the young (and, thus, away from the elderly), and at
the same time their savings are encouraged by promising them a lower tax on their
returns. The policy with »
0
t = 0 is basically a promise to evenly spread the burden
of ageing among the young and the elderly. Thus, the two analysed policies (that
is, with »
0
t < 0 and »
0
t = 0, respectively) can indeed be linked to real-world policies
a right-wing (Republican) and a left-wing (Democratic) political party, respectively,
would advocate. If no further shocks are to be expected after a demographic shock, an
elected left-winggovernment will leave the PAYG-systemin place. Private savings will
remain at its initial level as well. A right-wing government (i.e., one with »
0
t < 0) will,
if elected, partially replace the intergenerational transfer system by an intertemporal
transfer system (private savings) which promises a higher rate of return. But which
of the two parties will be elected? Is a transition to a more funded pension scheme
as proposed by the right-wing government politically feasible? That is the question
we address in this subsection.
In order to analyse this question, we have to compare the political support for
both parties as measured by their target function (5), as the party with the largest
political support will win the election. It will be clear from the previous subsections
that a left-wing government will, in reaction to ageing, initially increase the PAYG-
tax more than a right-wing government. Consequently, the current elderly are better
o¤ under a left-wing government and thus will support the left-wing party more than
16the right-wing party. In contrast to a left-wing government, a right-wing government
will initiate a pension reform by stimulating private savings, however. For a transition
policy to be politically feasible, it is necessary (but not su¢cient) that the increase in
savings initiated by a right-wing government raises the utility of the young such that
their political back up for the right-wing policy is larger than for the left-wing policy.
The analysis in part C of the Appendix learns that this is only possible if the level
of the capital tax in the initial steady state is strictly positive. The intuition for this
result is obvious: the utility of the young can only be raised by increasing savings if
the savings decision is distorted so that the initial level of savings is ine¢ciently low.
A striking consequence of this result is that a transition to funded pensions is not
possible if there is a subsidy on savings, as is frequently the case in the real world.
The condition that the capital tax is positive in the initial steady-state is not
su¢cient for a transition to be politically feasible, however. Numerical calculations
show that there exist combinations of 0 < » < 1 + r and »
0 < 0 such that, at the
time of the demographic shock, the right-wing reform plan outperforms the left-wing
policy in the sense of having a higher value of the target function W0: But in general
this will not be the case. In particular, a transition from PAYG-pensions to a capital
reserve system is only politically feasible if »
0 is small in absolute size. A small value
of »
0 implies that the initial increase in the PAYG-tax is su¢ciently large, relative to
the increase implemented by a left-wing party, to curtail the loss in political support
by the initial generation of elderly as much as possible. Moreover, a small value of
»
0 implies that the speed of the transition process is rather modest. A slow speed
of adjustment means, in turn, that the initial increase in the PAYG-tax is only very
gradually annulled. As a consequence, the initial young generation is not confronted
with a ‘too low’ bene…t level when old relative to their own PAYG-contribution when
young. This is necessary for their political support for the right-wing party to be
su¢ciently large to get/remain in o¢ce, even though the elderly favour a left-wing
government.
Finally, we have to check whether the timepath of taxes promised by the right-
wing party is time consistent. That is, we have to make sure that the right-wing
party, if it wins the initial elections, will not be defeated in future elections. If this
were the case, current savers would in the future be confronted with higher capital
taxes than promised by the right-wing party. Hence, they would not increase savings
and the transition would fail. It can be shown, however (see part C of the Appendix),
that this will not happen: if the utility gain for the young outweighs the utility loss
for the old (in terms of political support) at the start of the transition process, it will
also do so at any point in time during this process. Consequently, if the right-wing
party manages to win the elections immediately after the demographic shock, it will,
in the absence of further shocks, be able to remain in o¢ce.
5 Concluding remarks
In this paper we analysed whether ageing admits the (partial) transition from a
PAYG-…nanced to a funded social-security system in a representative democracy. The
motivation is that ageing deteriorates the internal rate of return of PAYG-systems,
17making it worthwhile to consider the viability of such a transition. As emphasised by
Feldstein (1996), the long-run gains of a transition are sizeable. Such a conversion,
however, is also known to be non-Pareto improving: some generation must bear the
cost. Obviously, redistributional issues are at the heart of the debate on social-
security reform. In a direct democracy where the median voter is relatively old (as in
Browning’s [1975]-model), the old voters can block transition as such a transition is
most likely not to their advantage. On the other hand, assuming that the government
operates in a representative democracy, it will trade o¤ the costs for the elderly against
the gains for the young. The question we try to answer is whether in that situation
the decrease in political support by the elderly can be dominated by the increased
political back up by the young.
Our main conclusion, based on a positive general-equilibrium model with a given
rate of interest, is that a (partial) transition from PAYG to a funded social-security
system can be politically feasible if three conditions are met. Firstly, there should
initially be a distortion in the individual savings decision that causes an ine¢ciently
low level of savings (that is, an initially positive capital tax). Secondly, a substitution
e¤ect towards more old-age consumption has to be introduced at the start of the
conversion policy. In particular, the PAYG-tax and the tax on savings should be
negatively related, i.e., an increase in the PAYG-tax should be accompanied by a
decline in the tax on capital. Issueing individual accounts coupled to a decrease
in the capital tax, as advocated in the 2000-election program of George W. Bush,
corresponds to such a conversion policy. Finally, the conversion policy should be very
gradual. Otherwise, the young will be confronted with too meagre bene…ts when old
and, therefore, their political support is not su¢ciently large to get the right-wing
party into o¢ce. This demonstrates that a fast transition as advocated by Feldstein
(1996) is not likely to be politically feasible.
What our model also highlights is that a conversion policy demands speci…c re-
arrangements of existing redistribution policies. As individual pension accounts can
only be implemented if part of the funds available for …nancing the pension bene…ts
are channelled to the young, a conversion policy typically implies redistribution from
the elderly to the young. In our model the capital tax is used as a …nancing device for
social security, apart from the PAYG-tax. Although we have not explicitly modeled
intragenerational inequality, the capital tax might thus be interpreted as leading to
intragenerational redistribution from rich (the wealth holders) to poor old individu-
als. One interpretation of our results, therefore, is that a conversion can be realised if
the capital tax gets less progressive. Stated di¤erently, perverse redistribution within
generations from poor to rich (elderly) might be unavoidable to start a conversion
policy. That is why a conversion policy demands the incumbent government to be of
a right-wing signature.
In the absence of a conversion policy, however, the costs of ageing are generally
evenly spread among the young and the elderly, and no (regressive) redistributions
within generations are required. Placed in this perspective, more e¢ciency (i.e., more
funding elements in social security) goes along with less equity (i.e., a larger wealth
inequality among the old). Therefore, not only the loss in support from the old should
be small enough in a representative democracy, but within the older generation the
18interests of the poor old individuals should moreover count less. This stresses once
again that the conversion issue is strongly mixed up with both intergenerational and
intragenerational issues. If trading o¤ intragenerational equity for intergenerational
e¢ciency induces additional losses in political support (as we did not assume in
our paper), social-security reform might be even harder to achieve than our results
suggest.
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21Appendix
The Appendix consists of three parts. The …rst part describes the linearised version
of the model and introduces the method of comparative dynamics. The second part
shows the pension-reform options given di¤erent relationships between the PAYG-tax
and the capital tax. In the last part, it is pointed out that a (partial) transition from
a PAYG-scheme to a more funded pension in an ageing economy is politically feasible
whenever in the initial steady state savings are discouraged, that is, a strictly positive
capital tax is in place.
A Comparative dynamics
This part of the Appendix describes the method of comparative dynamics for the
model presented in Section 2 and Section 3. Let ht describe the time pattern of
the perturbation of the steady-state value of the population growth rate n and ¼
the magnitude of the shock. As mentioned in section 4.1 we can write nt = n +
¼ht; t = 0;1;:::. The e¤ects of a marginal decrease or increase in n can be traced by
di¤erentiation of the …rst-order conditions (4) and (8) with respect to ¼ around the
























































where ´t is de…ned as ´t ´ ¢t¡»tst¡1. Furthermore, the linearised version of the ob-











































Equations (A.1) and (A.2) can be condensed to the following linear system in the






















5; t = 0;1;::: (A.4)





























As already noted in the main text, the initial steady-state level of the capital tax
is only of importance for the political feasibility of the pension reform and does
not qualitatively a¤ect the dynamics underlying the transition from PAYG to capital
reserve. Therefore, we may, for expositional simplicity, assume that » = 0 in the initial
steady state, that is ¸ = 1 + r. The subsequent analysis can easily be generalised to
positive and negative initial values for ». Under the assumption that ¸ = 1 + r, the



























This system comprises one predetermined or backward-looking variable (s) and one
jump or forward-looking variable (¿). The eigenvalues of the Jacobian matrix J are
given by,
"1 =
2 + r + n ¡ (1 + ½)Á ¡
p
©
2(1 + n + Á)
; (A.9)
"2 = "1 +
p
©
1 + n + Á
;
with
© = (2 + r + n ¡ (1 + ½)Á)
2 ¡ 4(1 + r)(1 + n + Á):
B The di¤erent pension-reform options
This part of the Appendix describes the dynamics of the system (A.4), with the
matrices J and M given by (A.7) and (A.8), respectively, for di¤erent relationships
between the PAYG-tax and the capital tax, i.e., di¤erent values of »
0:
23For »
0 < 0, it holds for the roots of the system (A.4) that "1 2 (0;1) and "2 > 1. So
the system is saddlepoint stable and can be solved to …nd the initial e¤ect of changes

































where jij and mij (i;j = 1;2) denote elements of J and M. To distinguish between



































Using the facts that
@s¡1





"2¡1; and, assuming that the once-














The evolution of both s and ¿ can then be derived from the system equations (A.4).
Given the evolution of these state variables, we can calculate the time paths of the
variables such as young-age and old-age consumption, lifetime utility, and the net
PAYG-bene…t.
The phaselines of the dynamical system (A.4), that is, the sets of points where it
holds that ¢s ´ @st
@¼ ¡
@st¡1
@¼ = 0 and ¢¿ ´
@¿t+1
@¼ ¡ @¿t























More explicitly, these lines, which are drawn in Figure 3, are given by






















From the dynamics, it immediately follows that the social-security tax initially jumps






(1 + r) + (1 + n)(1 + ½) ¡ Á
¿h: (A.15)




(2+½)(1+r)¿h > 0 and @¿
@¼ = 0.
Without a relation between the capital tax and the PAYG-tax (»
0 = Á = 0); the

























System (A.4) still comprises one predetermined or backward-looking variable (s) and
one jump or forward-looking variable (¿). The eigenvalues of the Jacobian matrix J
are now




where the last inequality follows from the assumption that the economy is dynamically
e¢cient. Because of the unit root, there are no saddlepoint dynamics and the new
steady state immediately occurs. The economy …nds itself in a savings trap. As can
be seen by inserting Á = 0 into (A14), the phaselines (A.13) and (A14) now coincide
(see Figure 4). The initial increase in the PAYG-tax is given by these phaselines with
@s¡1





(1 + r) + (1 + n)(1 + ½)
¿h. (A.18)
Notice that (A.18) can also be calculated through (A.12). Comparing (A.18) with
(A.15) shows that the initial increase of the PAYG-tax in case of no relation between »
and ¿ (»
0 = 0) is larger than the initial increase in case of a negative relation between
both (»
0 < 0). Because of the unit root of the Jacobian, the steady-state increase
in the PAYG-tax has to be equal to its initial increase and savings remain at their






0 > 0, the initial steady state can be characterised by a so-called Hopf bifurca-
tion for certain speci…c values of »
0. Given (A.7) and (A.8), system (A.4) has two
eigenvalues that are complex conjugates with modulus S 1 if Á R (r ¡ n). (the
latter inequality was obtained after numerical simulation experiments). According
to Farmer (1993, Chapter 3, note 3, p.236), the dynamics of the original nonlinear
model are not well approximated by a linearised model. However, as noted earlier we
abstract from this case for economic reasons as we restrict ourselves to the analysis
of steady states with strictly positive levels of …rst-period and second-period con-
sumption. Furthermore we assume that initially a PAYG-scheme is in place. These
constraints require 0 < ¿t < 1, where the second inequality states that the net wage
25of a young individual has to be positive. Given a positive relation between the capi-
tal tax and the social-security tax, that is »
0 > 0, the incumbent party will strive for
either no intergenerational redistribution at all (¿ = 0) or, in the presence of perfect
capital markets without borrowing constraints for an in…nite amount of intergenera-
tional redistribution (¿ ! 1), depending on the initial level of capital taxation (»).
This follows from the fact that (A.3) at time t = 0 can be written as (using the fact

























Using the fact that
@s¡1
@¼ = 0 and assuming that the once-and-for-all decrease in n is





















¸(2 + r + n) + (1 + n)(1 + r)(1 + ½)





(1 + n)(1 + ½) + ¸
¸
< 0:
So, given local stability of the steady state, i.e., Á > (r¡n), the incumbent government
at time t = 0 will maximise its re-election probability, that is, maximise Wo, by
in…nitely increasing or decreasing the PAYG-tax at its disposal. The PAYG-tax at
time t = 0 will tend to (minus) in…nity if (1+n)@¿1
@¿0 ? » @s0
@¿0. If (1+n)@¿1
@¿0 = » @s0
@¿0, the
initial PAYG-tax is not uniquely determined. For Á = (r¡n), a mild form of stability
loss arises and a bifurcation occurs. The analysis of bifurcations is not within the
scope of this paper as the existence of limit cycles complicates our original analysis to
a great extent. For Á < (r¡n), the initial steady state is locally unstable and the new
steady state can only be reached by an instantaneous jump of both system variables
to their new steady-state levels. However, as one of these variables is predetermined
(the level of private savings) the new steady state has to be characterised by the
same level of savings as the initial state. Moreover, the steady-state level of the
PAYG-tax is determined by the condition »(¿) = ¸¡1¡r. So, the new steady state
can only come about if it is characterised by the same level of the social-security tax
and the same level of private savings as the old one. However, this is not a feasible
allocation of consumption over the lifetime as ageing ceteris paribus implies a decline
of the PAYG-bene…t and thereby an increase in private savings. Therefore, given
Á < (r ¡ n), ageing implies explosive dynamics.
21For expositional simplicity, we assume without loss of generality that ½ = 0.
22See part C of the Appendix for a step-by-step derivation of (A.20).
26C The political feasibility and time consistency of a pension
reform
In this part of the Appendix, we …rst show that a (partial) transition from a PAYG-
scheme to a more funded pension in an ageing economy can be politically feasible for
a right-wing party (i.e., »
0 < 0) if the initial steady state is characterised by a strictly
positive capital tax, that is, if » > 0. A (partial) transition is politically feasible if, at
any instant, the value of the political target function given an extension of the existing
PAYG-scheme (executed by a left-wing incumbent party with »
0 = 0) is smaller than
the value of the target function given a social security reform implemented by a right-











If one, without loss of generality, abstracts from discounting (½ = 0), the initial















































where the second equality follows from the fact that in the steady state it holds that
co = ¸cy: Using the fact that
@s¡1
@¼ = 0 and assuming that the once-and-for-all decrease


















If the capital tax is not related to the size of the PAYG-scheme (»













»0=0. That is, the steady-state increase in the
tax is equal to its initial increase under the pension policy implemented by a left-wing
government. If the capital tax is negatively related to the size of the PAYG-scheme
(»


























»0=0. So, only if initially a strictly positive capital
tax is in place, the social-security reform proposed by the right-wing party may be
politically feasible. Numerical calculations show, however, that » > 0 is not su¢cient
for the right-wing party to carry the election. Apart from that, the parameter »
0 has
to be su¢ciently close to zero, making the policy look like a left-wing policy apart
from a small decrease in both the PAYG-tax and the capital tax, compared to the
taxes adopted by the left-wing party.
Finally, we show that a right-wing reform policy is time consistent. That is, if the





















»0=0 ¸ 0; t = 1;2;:::). Firstly, consider the dynamics under a right-
wing reform policy (»





denote the steady-state change in the level of
private savings, and recall that "1; with 0 < "1 < 1, denotes the stable root of the









































































Furthermore, equivalent to (A.13), the ¢s = 0-phaseline (which does not depend on
[the sign of] »
0) can be written as @¿t
@¼ = ¡£1
@st¡1
@¼ ¡£2¿h, with £1;£2 > 0. As, in case
of »
0 < 0; the new steady state lies on the intersection of the ¢s = 0-phaseline and



















Now, assume through an arbitrary period t ¡ 1; a continuous sequence of right-wing
governments has been in o¢ce, starting form period 0. Then, if a left-wing party
(with »
0 = 0) would be voted into o¢ce at time t; it would implement an increase
in the social-security tax which would be on the ¢s = 0-phaseline given the level






) (recall the analysis of a left-wing



































where the last equality follows from the fact that at time t = 0, a left-wing party





»0=0 (that is, an increase to the
point where the ¢s = 0-phaseline cuts the vertical axis [dee Figure 4]).
28With respect to the initial change in the target function of the political parties,



































; with ~ W(¢) a linear function. For »
















»0<0 by applying the
accompanying dynamical system. For »







»0=0. Ergo, at time t = 0, we have, in case of political feasibility of









































































where the …rst equality folows from equations (A25) and (A29). The second equality
follows from the fact that ~ W(¢) is a linear function, and the last (in)equality from the
fact that "t
1 > 0 for any …nite time t and limt!1 "t
1 = 0: So, (A.31) states that, at
any instant during transition phase, the value of the political target function given
a continuation of the right-wing reform policy, will be larger than the value of the
same function in case of a reversal to a left-wing policy. Consequently, an initially
politically feasible right-wing policy will not be abolished in the future and the partial







































˚4  =  -(1+n )
˚2  =  ˚3  =  -( 1+ r- >)










































˚4  =  -(1+n )
˚2
˚2  =  -(1+ r- >)
˚3  =  -(1+ r- >( J) )
˚1  =  8/(1 + D)
˚1 ˚3
˚4
Fi g ure  2MJt/ MB
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